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ENGINE OPERATING CONDITIONS THAT CAUSE THERMAL-FATIGUE
CRACKS IN TURBOJET-ENGINE BUCKETS _
By James R. Johnston, John W. Weeton
and Robert A. Signorelli
SUMMARY
Five engine tests were conducted to definitely establish the fail-
ure mechanism of leading-edge cracking and to determine which conditions
of engine operation cause the failures. Five groups of S-816 and M-252
buckets from master lots were run consecutively in the same J47-25 en-
gine. The tests included a steady-state run at full-power conditions,
rapid cycling between idle and rated speed_ and three different start-
stop tests. The first start-stop test consisted of cycles of start and
stop with 5 minutes of idle speed before each stop; the second included
cycles of start and stop but with IS minutes of rated speed before each
stop; the third consisted of cycles of gradual starts and normal stops
with 5 minutes at idle speed before each stop.
The test results demonstrated that the primary cause of leading-
edge cracking was thermal fatigue produced by repeated engine starts.
The leading edge of the bucket experiences plastic flow in compression
during starts and consequently is subjected to a tensile stress when the
remainder of the bucket becomes heated and expands. Crack initiation
was accelerated when rated-speed operation was added to each normal
start-stop cycle. This acceleration of crack formation was attributed
to localized creep damage and perhaps to embrittlement resulting from
overaging. It was demonstrated that leading-edge cracking can be pre-
vented simply by starting the engine gradually.
INTRODUCTION
in the st_ly of turbojet-engine material problems, the turbine
bucket is 6enerally consi_lered the most critical component b_caus_J it is
subjected to the most severe envirorment. The very high rot_tional
speeds _n_i hish Sas temperatures [reduce a stress and tempert_ture _'on-
ctltJon in the b_ckets which alone or in combination with other environ-
menthol conditions cr_n result in excessive creep or in failure, tn
addition to centrifugal stresses, vibratory stresses are also usually
induced in the airfoils of the buckets. Such stresses are produced by
pulsations of the hot gases as they flow from the combustion chambers
through the nozzle vanes and on to the rotating buckets. Thus, vibra-
tory stresses are superimposed as a bending or torsional stress upon the
centrifugal stress applied by the rotation of the turbine. Finally,
transient conditions of engine operation subject the buckets to rapid
changes of gas temperature so that relatively high thermal stresses may
be produced in the bucket airfoils.
In turbojet-engine studies conducted by the NASA (formerly the
NACA) over the last several years, much has been learned about the
stress rupture and fatigue mechanisms as they affect bucket life. Rela-
tively little has been learned about the influence of thermal stresses
on the life of turbojet buckets. The vast majority of work conducted
by the NASA has been done with the aid of a turbojet engine which sub-
jects the buckets to relatively high centrifugal stresses. Bucket fail-
ures that have occurred in this type of engine have been either conven-
tional stress-rupture-type failures or have had the characteristics of
mechanical-fatigue failures. In more recent investigations by the NASA,
in which an engine that produces low centrifugal stresses in the buck-
ets has been utilized for materials studies, a different situation has
arisen. The buckets of this engine have exhibited a multiplicity of
small cracks at the leading edges. Such a large number of cracks and
their position in the airfoil suggested that they were thermally induced
cracks. In the first preliminary tests, it was found that leading-edge
cracks, of the nature mentioned_ occurred in very short times and were
so extensive that the test procedure was modified to record the type of
cracks and the crack progression. A subsequent engine test was conduct-
ed_ and frequent bucket inspections of the leading edges were made. All
buckets were removed at intervals from the engine and inspected for min-
ute edge cracking. The results from the first published report of these
studies (ref. i) indicated that the leading-edge cracks were caused by
thermal fatigue. In the report it was reasoned that centrifugal stress
and vibratory stresses were of secondary importance in causing the
leading-edge cracks. This was also true of oxidation and residual
stresses induced during fabrication. The fact that a multiplicity of
cracks occurred at the leading edges in areas in which centrifugal
stresses were not high tended to show that the cracks were not predomi-
nantly of the stress-rupture type. The fact that mechanical-fatigue
cracks, when they have occurred in buckets in the past, have formed usu-
ally one or two major cracks and not a multiplicity of cracks suggested
that mechanical fatigue was not the predominant mechanism. Similarly_
the other failure mechanisms were eliminated as probable causes of the
leading-edge cracks.
In another research project it had been shown that the J47 engine_
the engine used for the present thermal-fatigue investigation, Produced
I
5!
L)
large temperature gradients in leading edges of the bucket airfoils dur-
ing normal engine starts, accelerations, and decelerations (ref. 2).
The most severe gradients occurred during starting when the temperature
difference between the leading edge and the midchord was 600 ° F. Cal-
culations based on additional (unpublished) transient temperature meas-
urements (including bucket skin temperatures) have indicated that during
engine starts thermal stresses are sufficiently high to cause yielding
of the bucket material at the leading edge. The transient temperature
studies and the skin temperature studies have tended to verify the ini-
tial conclusions that the leading-edge cracks were of a thermal-fatigue
type. However_ it should be cautioned that all these tests do not de-
finitely prove that the failures resulted from thermal fatigue.
Still other engine tests have been conducted (results in prepara-
tion for publication) at higher temperatures. Again these tests have
shown that leading-edge cracking was a severe problem, and, again, in-
direct evidence was obtained to indicate that the cracks were caused by
thermal fatigue. In these studies, the engine test temperatures were
higher than those of the references mentioned earlier_ and the times for
the formation of the cracks were lower. In these latter tests and in
the previous engine tests, the cracking of the leading edges was not
limited to a specific material or alloy type. Cracks were observed in
both forged and cast materials and in nickel- and cobalt-base alloys.
Materials tested in the above-mentioned investigations were: S-816_
M-252, Udimet 500, the Inconel series - 550, 700, and 713, and several
experimental alloys.
The purposes of the investigation reported herein are: (i) to
prove that the leading-edge cracks which may be produced on the edges
of the J_7 buckets are thermal-fatigue cracks, (2) to determine the
exact portion of the engine operating cycle primarily responsible for
the initiation of the cracks, (3) to determine if other portions of
the engine operating cycle may contribute to the crack formation or
to the time of initiation_ and (A) to suggest possible remedial meas-
ures to alleviate the cracking problem.
Buckets of M-252 and S-816 were tested in a J_7-25 engine. The
two _terials were chosen because they were readily available in large
lots and because they differed considerably in susceptibility to leading-
edge cracking. The engine used was selected because it was a model in
which cracking had occurred in relatively short periods of operation.
Five engine tests were performed during the investigation. These
were conducted in the following manner. The first test consisted of a
steady-state operation of a set of buckets at rated-speed or full-power
conditions. The second consisted of rapid cycling of the engine between
idle and full-power conditions. The third consisted of cycles of start-
ing the engine, running it for 5 minutes at idle speed_ and stopping.
4The fourth consisted of cycles of starting the engine, running for 15
minutes at rated speed, and stopping; and the fifth consisted of cycles
of starting the engine gradually_ running for 5 minutes at idle speed,
and stopping. Prior to each of the five tests, a new group of buckets
was installed in the engine. All the buckets in the investigation came
from the samemaster lots.
MATERIALS,APPARATUS,ANDPROCEDURE
Turbine Buckets
The turbine buckets used in this investigation were standard J47-25
buckets forged from S-816 (AMS-5765A)and M-252 alloys having the fol-
lowing nominal compositions by weight percent:
Alloy Cr
S-816 20
M-252 19
Ni Co
20 44.8
(Balance)
55.4 10
(Balance)
Mo W Fe Cb Ti Al C
4 4 2.8 4.0 ...... 0.4
i0 - 2 --- 2.5 1.0 0.i
The buckets were obtained from two sources. The M-252 buckets were re-
ceived in one lot from the fabricator. Although obtained directly from
the ma_mfacturer, the M-252 buckets were from production lots which
would normally supply Air Force stock. The S-816 buckets were randonuly
selected from Air Force stock. The buckets had received the standard
production heat treatments and were tested in the as-received condition.
The master lots of buckets were divided by random selection into
five equal groups_ one of which was used in each of the five engine
tests. In each test there were 25 M-252 and 69 S-816 buckets.
Before installation into the test engine, the buckets were in-
spected for surface flaws using postemulsified zyglo. All buckets used
in the tests were free of surface defects within the sensitivity of the
inspection process. At appropriate intervals throughout each engine
test the buckets were removed from the engine and reinspected to detect
cracks which formed during engine operation. The inspection interval
varied with the type of test as indicated later in the descriptions of
of engine operation.
5Stress and Temperature Distribution in Buckets
The centrifugal stress and temperature distributions in the bucket
airfoil at rated engine conditions are shownin figure i. The stress
calculations were madeusing rotational speed, material density, and
bucket geometry (ref. 3). The temperature distribution in the test en-
gine was obtained with a spare turbine wheel prior to the installation
of the test wheels. Six thermocouples were imbeddedin the bucket air-
foils to provide the spanwise temperature profile. By using the stress
and temperature distribution in the bucket and stress-rupture data for
the material_ expected failure time can be computedfor various sections
along the airfoil span. The point with the lowest expected life is the
critical zone_ that is_ the zone where fracture would occur if tempera-
ture and centrifugal stress were the only factors contributing to fail-
ure. The critical zone was given (for similar stress and temperature
data) in reference I as centered at approximately 1.5 inches from the
base of the airfoil. The expected life in the critical zone was greater
than i0,000 hours.
The bucket material temperatures were not measuredduring the
transient portions of the tests. It is believed_ however, that the
transient temperatures encountered were similar to those reported in
reference 2.
Engine Operation
The five tests of this investigation were run consecutively in the
sameengine. The engine was not altered in any mannerbetween tests
except for modifications to the fuel controls as described later.
Engine speed was controlled during the idle and rated conditions at
3000 and 7950 rpm, respectively. Engine gas temperature was regulated
by use of a variable-area exhaust nozzle. Turbine bucket temperatures
were monitored by two thermocouples embeddedin bucket airfoils. Dur-
ing the idle and rated-speed conditions_ the bucket temperatures at the
critical zone (1.5 in. from base) were controlled at i000° F and 1440° F,
respectively. These temperature levels correspond to allowable service
conditions in military engines.
Steady-state test. - Before installation of the first group of test
buckets, the engine was operated with a spare turbine wheel in order to
detect any malfunctions that would cause premature shutdowns. In addi-
tion, the engine was equipped with an auxiliary oil supply to permit
operation for times longer than normal.
6The test engine was started as gently as possible with the standard
fuel control in order to avoid excessive exhaust gas temperatures and
was accelerated gradually to rated speed. This was done to minimize the
effect of transient conditions on the buckets. The engine was operated
continuously at rated speed until the inspection interval of 72 hours
was reached or until an emergencyshutdown was required. In most cases_
the engine did not run the full 72 hours without a shutdown. Unplanned
shutdowns resulted from malfunctioning of the engine accessories and
thermocouple instrumentation and from the general deterioration of the
tailcone and exhaust pipe sections, which required frequent repairs.
However, a total test time of 360 hours was accumulated with only nine
starts and stops for an average of 40 hours per start.
Ra_id cycle test. - In this test a new group of buckets was in-
stalled in the engine and operated through cycles of rapid acceleration
and deceleration between idle and rated speed. The total time of each
complete cycle was i_I minutes: 15 seconds each for acceleration and de-
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celeration and 30 seconds hold at each speed (idle and rated). In order
to relieve the engine operators of the necessity of manually controlling
the engine cycles_ an automatic actuator was linked to the fuel regula-
tor. However, the fuel regulator continued to govern the rate of accel-
eration in the normal manner.
It was desired to shut down the engine only at regular periods of
cycles (_ hr) in order to inspect the buckets for cracks_ however_250
several unplanned shutdowns were required for engine maintenance. Dur-
ing the test, the engine had been started gently and shut down a total
of 14 times. The test was terminated after 1984 cycles.
Start-stop test. - A third group of new buckets was installed in
the engine and subjected to repeated cycles of normal starts and shut-
downs. The engine was held at idle speed for 5 minutes before each
shutdown. Since the fuel control valve of the engine is manually gov-
erned during the starts, the maximum engine temperature attained depends
upon the experience and skill of the operator. For these tests_ the
operator was required to hold the maximum exhaust gas temperature be-
tween 1400 ° and 1500 ° F. In military service this is considered a
normal start for the engine. A cooling period was required between
starts to allow the buckets to approach room temperature. To permit a
reasonable number of start cycles each day_ it was necessary to restart
while the buckets were still warm_ but in every case the buckets were
cooled below 200 ° F.
The buckets were removed for inspection at intervals of approxi-
mately 40 cycles. The test was terminated after 425 cycles at which
time 84 percent of the buckets of one alloy had developed leading-edge
cracks.
Start - rated-speed - stop test. - The fourth group of buckets was
subjected to cycles of starting and stopping with the addition of 15
minutes at rated speed before each shutdown. In this case the engine
was accelerated and decelerated gradually between idle and rated speeds
in order that no large thermal stresses would result from these
transients.
The inspection period was shortened to intervals of 20 cycles be-
cause cracks were expected to form more readily in this type of opera-
tion. The test was completed after 200 cycles when 76 percent of the
buckets of one alloy exhibited cracking.
Gradual-start - normal-stop test. - The final group of test buckets
was operated through start-stop cycles as in the case of the third test_
except that the severity of engine starts was greatly reduced. In order
to start the engine more gradually than normal (i.e._ to raise the tem-
perature at a significantly lower rate)_ it was necessary to alter the
fuel system.
In the standard-engine fuel system_ duplex fuel nozzles in all
eight combustors are supplied by two common manifolds. In the standard
engine, fuel is supplied only to the small slots while starting in order
to limit the fuel flow in each combustor. However_ the fuel flow neces-
sary to sustain combustion causes the engine temperature to rise very
rapidly. To prevent this rapid temperature rise_ a distributing valve
was designed to supply fuel to each combustor nozzle in sequence. This
permitted the engine to ignite on one combustor and the engine tempera-
ture to increase gradually as each succeeding nozzle was supplied with
fuel. A comparison of the exhaust gas temperatures for the gradual
start and a normal start is shown in figure 2.
The buckets were inspected at intervals of about 40 cycles up to
500 starts after which the period was increased to each i00 cycles. The
test was terminated after 900 cycles failed to cause bucket cracking.
Metallographic Examination
Two buckets each of M-252 and S-816 from both the start-stop test
and the start - rated-speed - stop test (eight buckets total) were sec-
tioned for metallographic examination. Photomicrographs were taken to
illustrate typical microstructures near the leading edge in cracked
buckets. For comparison purposes_ two unused buckets of each alloy were
also sectioned to obtain typical microstructures of the as-recieved
materials.
8RESULTS
The results from the five engine tests are summarizedin table I
together with the time at rated speed and the numberof starts for each
test. Leading-edge cracks were observed in only two of the tests: the
normal-start - stop test and the test in which rated-speed operation was
added to each start-stop cycle. Since there was no indication of crack
initiation in any of the other three tests, they were terminated after
reasonably long test periods. In these cases_ whenno cracks were pro-
duced, the tests were continued until the total time at rated speed or
the total number of cycles was about an order of magnitude greater than
the values which were knownto cause cracking in typical endurance tests
(ref. i).
Leading-Edge Cracking
During the normal-start - stop test, cracks were first observed in
the M-252 buckets at 85 cycles and in the S-816 buckets at 295 cycles.
At the end of the test (A2S cycles), 84 percent of the M-252 buckets
and about 9 percent of S-816 buckets were cracked. A series of photo-
graphs was taken (figs. S(a), (b), and (c)) of a typical group of M-252
buckets to indicate the type of cracks observed and to show the extent
of crack propagation. In general, the cracks inM-252 propagated grad-
ually to an appreciable depth} the maximum depth of the deeper cracks
was 1/8 inch. The cracks in S-816 were less severe, usually about 1/32
inch or less in depth. Many cracks propagated to their maximum depth
relatively early in the test.
During the start - rated-speed - stop test (in which iS min of
rated-speed operation were added to each start-stop cycle)_ cracks were
first noted in the M-252 buckets at 40 cycles and in the S-816 buckets
at 63 cycles. At the end of the test (200 cycles and SO hr at rated
speed), cracks were observed in 76 percent and _2 percent of the M-252
and the S-816 buckets, respectively. Figure 4 shows the leading-edge
cracking in typical M-252 and S-816 buckets during this test. The maxi-
mum depth of crack propagation was 6/8 inch in the M-252 and 1/2 inch in
the S-816 buckets. These deep cracks were not typical of all the buck-
ets. The average maximum crack depth for all the cracked buckets in
this test was about S/$2 inch for M-252 and about 1/8 inch in S-816.
None of the cracks propagated to complete fracture.
Microstructure of Cracked Buckets
Typical microstructures of untested buckets of S-816 and M-252 are
shown in figure S. The structures appear to be normal for the as-heat-
treated condition of each alloy. The microstructures of both alloys
run in the start-stop test (fig. 6(a)) exhibit agglomeration and sphe-
roidization of grain boundary precipitates_ but the hyphenation of grain
boundaries is more pronounced in M-252. The S-816 bucket indicates a
slight tendency to form precipitation along slip lines. Figure 6(b)
shows the microstructu_e of cracked buckets after operation in the en-
gine test in which 15 minutes of rated time were added to each start-
stop cycle. In the case of M-252, the microstructure is not greatly
different from that of the bucket from the start-stop test, but there
appears to be slightly more matrix precipitation along residual grain
boundaries. The microstructure of the S-816 bucket from the start -
rated-speed - stop test contains definite evidence of overaging. In
addition to the grain boundary hyphenation_ there is considerable matrix
precipitation, especially along slip lines.
Buckets of both M-252 and S-816 from the start - rated-speed - stop
test contained clusters of voids along the grain boundaries in areas
close to the leading edge. Some of these voids are apparent in the
photomicrographs of figure 6(b). There was no significant evidence of
voids in either alloy operated in the start-stop engine test.
DISCUSSION
The results of this investigation showed that the leading-edge
cracks in buckets result from thermal fatigue produced by repeated cy-
cles of starts and stops. This is evidenced by the fact that cracks
were produced in a test consisting only of cycles of starting, running
the engine at idle for 5 minutes, and stopping. Since the centrifugal
stress at idle speed is trivial (2000 against 15,000 psi at rated speed),
it is logical to assume that any damage that occurred during the start-
stop test was due primarily to cyclic thermal stresses. Also_ the tem-
perature of the buckets at idle speed is quite low_ on the order of
i000 ° F_ so that oxidation can be excluded as an important factor. In
addition_ it was shown that mechanical vibration did not contribute ap-
preciably to the initiation of leading-edge cracks. This was demon-
strated by the fact that cracks were not initiated by continuous opera-
tion at rated speed and temperature or by a great number of acceleration-
deceleration cycles (between idle and full power). Also, the relatively
long time of idle speed accumulated during the gradual-start - normal-
stop test did not initiate cracks. These types of operation would have
been most likely to induce vibration in the buckets.
It was also shown that engine starting alone was chfefly respon-
sible for the crack formation. This was demonstrated by the gradual-
start - normal-stop test in which 900 cycles failed to initiate any
cracks, whereas only 85 normal-start - stop cycles were sufficient to
cause crack formation. It follows from these results that normal stops
alone calmot initiate cracks and_ hence, that most of the damage occurs
during the normal engine starts.
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The one unique feature of engine starts is the very high tempera-
ture gradients which they induce into the bucket airfoil during the
rapid heating almost immediately after ignition. It has been shown
(ref. 2) that the temperature gradient across the chord during starts is
appreciably more severe than those that occur during any other transient
thermal condition which the engine experiences. The presence of these
large temperature gradients and the resulting high thermal stresses dur-
ing starting plainly indicates why engine starts can cause thermal-
fatigue failure of the leading edge.
Since surface cracks of the type observed on the buckets are gen-
erally associated with tensile stresses_ it maynot be obvious how they
are caused by a heating cycle (engine starts) where surface thermal
stresses are compressive. The following discussion is believed to ex-
plain adequately the formation of tensile stresses in the leading edges
of buckets upon heating. Uponengine starting, the sudden impingement
of hot gases onto the leading edge of the bucket causes the temperature
to rise in this region more rapidly than the bucket temperature as a
whole. The leading-edge material tends to elongate as a consequenceof
this temperature rise but is partially restrained by the more massive
relatively cool portions of the bucket. Consequently, a compressive
stress will be induced into the outer fibers of the leading edge. If
the heating conditions are very severe_ the compressive stress will be
sufficient to cause local plastic deformation at the leading edge. Then
as the bulk of the airfoil becomesheated to a uniform temperature, the
portion of the leading edge that experienced plastic flow in compression
will be stretched by the thermal expansion of the interior portion of
the airfoil. This will create a residual tensile stress at and near
the surface of the leading edge. During stopping or cooling of the en-
gine, additional stresses would be induced in the leading edge.
The results further showedthat engine operation at rated speed
and temperature accelerated the formation of leading-edge cracks. The
addition of 15 minutes of rated-speed operation to each start-stop cycle
reduced the number of cycles to cause cracks from 85 to 40 for M-252 and
from 295 to 65 for S-816. The total rated-speed times in these in-
stances were i0 hours and 15 hours for M-252 and S-816, respectively.
Since these times are trivial in comparison with the expected rupture
life of the bucket material under the full-power engine conditions(over i0,000 hr), it cannot be expected that the reduction in cycles to
cause cracking was due to the attrition of the nominal stress-rupture
strength of the alloys. It is more reasonable to conclude that the
damagewhich occurred during engine operation at rated conditions re-
suited from the combination of the residual stresses caused by each
start and the high temperature at rated speed. As discussed previously,
it is believed that each engine start induces a residual tensile stress
!
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into the leading-edge portion of the bucket. When the engine is sub-
sequently operated at high speed and temperature_ this part of the
bucket is subjected to a much higher tensile stress than the nominal
stress in the major portion of the bucket airfoil. Of course, the time
that the high residual stress is present may be very short since local-
ized creep may relax the stresses at the leading edge. However_ the
damage will be cumulative because the next start will induce new resid-
ual stresses in the leading edge, and the process will be repeated.
The hypothesis of localized creep damage at the leading edge is
supported by the appearance of voids in the grain boundaries (fig. 6(b))
of buckets run in the start - rated-speed - stop test. These voids are
sometimes noted in rupture specimens (ref. _) and are considered to be
evidence of third-stage creep. Similar voids also have been noted in
buckets which failed by a similar mechanism in other engine tests (ref.
5). Since the voids occur only in the areas close to the leading edge
where the high thermal stresses are induced during starts, it seems
reasonable to associate the creep damage with the stresses that arise
as a result of engine starts.
There is some evidence that mierostructural changes aside from
creep dsm_ge may also have contributed to the earlier cracking of the
buckets run in the start - rated-speed - stop test. As noted in the re-
sults_ the photomicrographs in figure 6(b) indicate a more advanced state
of aging than was evident in the buckets from the start-stop test (fig.
6(a). In the case of S-816, the structure appears definitely overaged.
The evidence of overaging is not apparent in the M-252 structure, but it
is possible that there were submicroscopic effects in M-252 involving
precipitation of intermetallic compounds. It is possible that overaging
caused some embrittlement of the bucket materials (run in the start -
rated-speed - stop test) and reduced their resistance to failure by
thermal fatigue.
Another significant result of the series of engine tests was the
demonstration that leading-edge cracking was prevented by reducing the
severity of the engine starts. It was shown, by incorporating a simple
distributing valve into the fuel system and by permitting an additional
90 seconds for starting_ that the engine could be started without a
rapid rise in gas temperature (fig. 2). It appears that this reduction
in the rate of gas temperature rise reduced the thermal stresses in the
buckets sufficiently to preclude failure by thermal fatigue. The sim-
plicity of this remedy suggests that it might be considered for use on
Jet engines in applications where the slight extra time could be toler-
ated. It should be possible to do this in commercial types of aircraft
and in some military vehicles such as bombers and trainers.
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CONCLUSIONS
A series of engine tests was conducted to definitely establish the
failure mechanismof leading-edge cracking and to determine which con-
ditions of engine operation cause the failures. Buckets of M-252 and
S-816 were tested in a J47-25 engine. The test program yielded the fol-
lowing conclusions:
I. Thermal fatigue _s definitely established as the failure mecha-
nism responsible for the initiation of leading-edge cracks. It was
shownthat engine starts were chiefly responsible for the crack forma-
tion. The leading-edge material of the bucket experiences plastic flow
in compression during engine starts as a result of the rapid increase
in the temperature of the thin leading edge and consequently is sub-jected to a tensile stress whenthe remainder of the bucket becomes
heated and expands.
2. Leading-edge crack formation was accelerated whenengine opera-
tion at rated speed and temperature was added to each stop-start cycle.
The accelerated crack initiation was attributed to localized creep dam-
age at the leading edge and possibly to embrittlement resulting from
overaging.
3. It was possible to eliminate (or drastically reduce) thermal-
fatigue cracking by the simple expedient of starting the jet engine
slowly. It should be possible to do this in commercial types of air-
craft and in somemilitary vehicles such as bombersand trainers.
Lewis Research Center
National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration
Cleveland_ Ohio_ January 13, 1959
REFERENCES
i. Springsteen, D. F._ Gyorgak, C. A., and Johnston, J. R.: Origin and
Development of Leading-Edge Cracks in Turbojet Engine Buckets.
NACARME57CI2_1957.
2. Lewis Laboratory Staff: Factors that Affect Operational Reliability
of Turbojet Engines. NACARMESSH02,1956.
3. Kemp,Richard H., and Morgan, William C.: Analytical Investigation
of Distribution of Centrifugal Stresses and Their Relation to
Limiting Operating Temperatures in Gas-Turbine Blades. NACARM
E7L05_1948.
15
4. McLean_D.: A Note on the Metallography of Crack_ng During Creep.
Jour. Inst. Metals, vol. 85, July 1957, pp. 468-472.
5. Signorelli_ Robert A., Johnston_ JamesR., and Garrett, Floyd B.:
Effect of Prior Air Force Overtemperature Operation on Life of J47
Buckets Evaluated in a Sea-Level Cyclic Engine Test. NACATN
4263_ 1958.
Z_
U]
E_
U]
H
I
E_
-i_
_H
_ _d
_O
oD
C{_ l
0
"rll 0"I
_H 0 l_
0 _ -_
LO
,-I
cO
I
o,.1
0
u_
0
0 0
_O
0 0
cO P---
'd'O
tn
4a
o9
,0,0-
01
..t.a
o
o
u_
o
o
o
o
o
0_
o
o)
o
0_
o
0_
o
o
u_
o
o
o
0 co
LO tO
0"_ CO
o o
CO 0
CO "_
0
4-_ ",_ -_ _
O-P _1 p._
q_
0
@
P_
gt
-0 II)
0
t,O
-0
!
4._
r,_
co
r-I
0
0
!
'd
0
L_ 0 0
0-1 0 0
0 0
LO
P-I
0
I
p-,
0
t_
I
@
P-I
I
0
0
.-'4
0_
0
cO
0
0
0
P_
0
..p
I
I
,--I
%
u'?
4._
C6
.H
m
©
,-I
O
U
cO
,H
15
18_I0 S
_o
u)
©
+_
(D
16
12
i0
\
\
/
emperature
ress
\ 1500
1400
1300
1200
0
J
_J
@
o
.S 1.0 l.S 2.0 2.S 3.0
Distance above base_ in.
Figure i. Distribution of centrifugal stress and temperature
in J47 turbine bucket at rated-speed conditions.
16
i
l
!
l
i
i <
t
0
0 0
0 0
co 04
,_1 ,-4
i
i /.i
i
/
f
p.,
.r-I
0
E
.,-t
E_
\
I
\
|
I
\
0 0
0 0
oD
0
r4
0
%+1
0
o_
0
0
0
.r-I
+_
-rt
.r--I
4-_
c_
E
0
0.]
0
.,-t
b_
£
@
0
4s,
6
ba
6
_4
6
0
b.O
.H
@
55
-.It,
6
@
@
4_
r_
N
hi?
4 _
c_
i
cad
%
.r-I
£o _a_ns_adma% se_ %sneqx Z
17
,.4
0
'4
I
.,d
(a) Inspection_ 115 starts.
Figure 3. - Progression of cracks in M-252 buckets during
start-stop test.
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(a) M-252. Etchant, 92 percent HCl - 5 percent H2S04 - S
percent HN05 .
<,-,_. 7 :
(b) S-810. Etchant, aqua regia plus glycerol.
/
Figure 5. - Microstructures of as-received buckets. X750.
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M-252.
HN0
3
Etchant, 92 percent HCI - 5 percent H2SO 4 - S percent
S-816. Etchant, aqua regia plus glycerol.
(a) Cycle: start, 5 minutes at idle, and stop.
Figure 6. - Microstructures of buckets after engine
testing. X750.
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\
M-252. Etchant, 92 percent HCI - 5 percent H2S04 - 5 percent
HNO 3 •
S-816. Etchant, aqua regia plus glycerol.
(b) Cycle: start, 15 minutes at rated speed, and stop.
Figure 6. - Concluded. Microstructures of buckets after engine
testing. X750.
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